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 
Abstract— SDN architecture overwhelms traditional network 
architectures by software abstraction for a centralize control of 
the entire networks. It provides manageable network 
infrastructures that consist millions of computing devices and 
software. In this work, we present multi-domain SDNs 
architecture with an integration of Spamhaus server. The 
proposed method allows SDN Controllers to update the 
Spamhaus server with latest detected spam signatures. It can 
help to prevent any spam email from entering others SDN 
domains. We also discussed a method for analyzing SMTP spam 
frames using a decision tree algorithm. We use Mininet tool to 
simulate the multi-domain SDNs with the Spamhaus server. The 
simulation results show that a packet Retransmission Timeout 
(RTO) between server and client can help to detect the SMTP 
spam frames. 
 
Index Terms—SDN, Software Define Network, SMTP, Spam, 
Botnet, SDN Security, OpenFlow, Mininet 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
SDN is an architecture for multi devices communication in 
integrated networks. It provides manageable network 
infrastructures that consist millions of computing devices and 
software. Due to growing of device connectivity and speeds, 
tradition networks such as LANs and WANs are no longer 
capable of optimizing all connectivity (e.g. network routing)   
and to secure networks from multi-faceted security threats. 
Traditional firewall and IDS are not capable of preserving a 
large network such as monitoring all inbound and outbound 
packets because the internet data is too huge to be monitored. 
Cloud Computing, Bigdata and IoT create deadly network 
traffics for the traditional network architecture, which it will 
cause an obsoleting and soon it will cripple the existing 
network functionality. SDN is one of a promising architecture 
that allows huge WANs/MANs to be controlled using a 
high-level of abstraction. The SDN architecture splits the 
 
 
centralize control of the entire networks (control plane) from 
an actual network data and routing process (data plane). All 
network behavior will be programmed in the centralize control 
using programmatic software such as SDN Application and 
Controller. The SDN architecture also provides a centralized 
security control that can help to prevent illegitimate access or 
network attacks such as DDos. 
In this work, we present multi-domain SDNs architecture 
with an integration of Spamhaus server. The proposed method 
allows SDN Controllers to update the Spamhaus server with 
latest detected spam signatures. It can help to prevent any spam 
email from entering others SDN domains. We also discussed 
the method for analyzing SMTP spam frames using a decision 
tree algorithm. We divided this work into six sections. The first 
Introduction section provides an introduction to SDN and 
traditional network architecture. It follows the Related Works 
section that discusses SDN and STMP attack using botnets. 
After that, we discuss methodology adopted to prevent spam in 
SMTP protocol in the Methodology section. In the Simulation 
Setup section, we simulate the proposed method using an 
actual data in Mininet tool. We present simulation results and 
discussion using the Mininet in the Results and Discussion 
section. Finally, we conclude this work and propose a future 
work in the Conclusion section. 
 
II. RELATED WORKS 
This section presents related works:  
A. Software Define Network (SDN) 
SDN is an architecture for multi devices communication in 
integrated networks. In the initial stage, it allows multiple 
LANs devices and systems to be integrated into WAN 
networks. The first SDN began after Java language released by 
Sun Microsystem, which AT&T Labs Geoplex project used 
Java to program APIs to implement middleware networking 
[1]. The Geoplex provided open networking standard for 
network integrations and communications such as system 
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managements and provisions, integrated security and system 
authentication, network monitoring etc. The most prominent 
functionality of the Geoplex is it allows network IPs to be 
mapped to one or many system and services [2]. In 2008, 
research and development for SDN continue by UC Berkeley 
and Stanford University [3]. By 2011, Open Networking 
Foundation (ONF) continues to develop OpenFlow for SDN 
[4]. The ONF provides SND resources (e.g. switch 
specification) for product manufacturer and software 
developer to implement SDN using the OpenFlow’s standard 
and protocol [5].  
Figures 1 and 2 show a general SDN architecture and its 
stacks. In SDN topology, all network nodes or devices are 
controlled using a control plane. The architecture splits the 
control plane from actual network data and routing process 
(data plane). The infrastructure layer communicates with SDN 
Controller using Control Data Plane (CDP) API (e.g. 
OpenFlow). All nodes or routers in the SDN network will use 
the CDP API for all control plane communication. The control 
layer consists of SDN Control Software or Controller, which 
extract information from the infrastructure layer such as a list 
of all devices in the SDN network and its states. It does not 
provide the entire information of all connected devices, but it 
provides an abstract view of the SDN network and topology. 
The application layer uses information from the control layer 
for a network abstraction administrative such as network 





Fig.  1.  SDN architecture [8].  
Many SDN runs over a virtualized architecture, which the 
application and control layers may execute in various devices 
that including a virtual machine in cloud computing [10,11]. 
This allows application and control layers to be distributed on 
various computing platforms, which it will increase flexibility, 
mobility and computing power using the virtualized 
architecture, system and devices [12–14]. 
In this work, we will not discuss the advantage of SDN in 
distributed systems, but we want to assess a network security 
through SDN. The next subsection will discuss further the 
network security and threats in the SDN. 
 
Fig.  2.  SDN’s stacks [9]. 
B. Network Security by SDN 
Distributed systems such as cloud computing and Internet of 
Things (IoT) are not the main factors for organizations to 
migrate theirs network infrastructure into SDN, another main 
reason is a network security that offered by the SDN [15,16]. 
The SDN allows an abstraction of network security that 
provides a central authority in a network, which previously 
hard to be done by traditional distributed networking systems 
and infrastructures [4,5]. There are also new security problems 
introduces by an implementation the SDN in network 
infrastructure, but we are not going to discuss in this 
publication and one may refer to [16–19] for further 
examinations regarding these security problems. The 
following paragraphs will discuss security threats and its 
countermeasures using SDN. 
N. Hoque et al. [20] discuss tools use by attackers and 
network administrators in SDN. Major attacks on SDN are Dos 
and DDos [21] that mounted by botnets [22]. Most botnets will 
try to prevent access to computing resources in the SDN by 
draining computing capability of the target computing system. 
An attacker(s) frequently used SYN-Flooding Attack [23], 
which sends a flood of TCP/SYN packets  (by zombie 
machines) and leave the 3-ways TCP handshake protocol 
hang-up without ACK packets. This attack applied to all 
application protocols that are used TCP based connections 
such as SMTP, FTP, HTTP, DNS etc. Traditional network 
security systems and infrastructures rely on Intrusion 
Detection System (IDS) and firewall to protect LAN, WAN 
from the internet. It might work well for a small and 
manageable network such as LAN, but not for multi-WANs in 
a large organization (or a join of multiple organizations) in 
distance geographical locations. Furthermore, applying SDN 
for the entire internet is far away than a current topic, which 
requires, at least a successful implementation of SDN for 
multi-WANs. We skipped this part, but we want to narrow 
down our discussion that to improve an efficiency for botnet 
attack detections on SMTP protocol. The next paragraph will 
explore the existing methods in preventing the botnet attacks 
on SMTP protocol. 
The most common way to detect botnet attacks are using a 
signature-based of known attacks [24], and a real-time 
detection of network anomalies [24,25] using IDS. Both 
22
  
methods used congestion control and drop packet to block 
DDos attacks, which called Pushback method [21]. The 
signature-based requires others systems to provide the 
signature of known attacks, which can be derived from the 
real-time detection from a shared database. Routers within the 
same LANs/WANs may share or distribute attack signatures, 
for examples a list of blacklisted source and destination IPs, 
payloads, Time-to-Live (TTL) [26] etc. Another method to 
detect potential attacks is using a network traffic classification. 
It can help to identify packets send by botnets at local and 
enterprise networks [27]. This method may be integrated into 
the real-time detection method. 
In this work, we used Round-Trip Time (RTT) and 
Retransmission Timeout (RTO) to detect an anomaly in SMTP 
traffic, which similar to works done by [27–32]. We enhance 
the existing detection methods using a new decision tree 
algorithm for improving detection efficiency. Second, we 
integrated Spamhaus [33] into SDN for a detection botnet 
controller list (BCL) among SDN domains. The Spamhaus 
server will serve all SDN Domain Controllers with latest 
botnet controller list  (BCL). We discuss the proposed 
solutions in the Methodology section. 
III. METHODOLOGY 
This section will present the problem statements and 
proposed solutions. Based on latest literature as 
aforementioned for botnet focusing on smtp protocol detection 
in SDN, RTT and RTO are used for anomaly detection in 
SMTP traffic. However, the aforementioned literature did not 
integrate the multi-domain SDNs with Spamhaus server. S. 
Seeber et al [33] proposed to use the existing database (spam 
signatures) to secure SDN domain. We propose to integrate the 
Spamhaus server with multi-domain SDNs, which allow SDN 
Controllers to update the Spamhaus with latest botnet 
controller list (BCL). This will mitigate any botnet attack on 
smtp server from entering others SDN domains because all 
SDN domains will have the latest latest botnet controller list 
(BCL) from the Spamhaus server.  
 
Fig.  4.  Decision tree 
 
Figure 3 show the proposed method for the Spamhaus 
implementation in multi-domain SDNs. For an example, a 
bulk botnet attack  SMTP server were executed by botnets in 
Domain A. Controller SDN in the Domain A will verify all 
SMTP frames using information from the Domain A 
Controller. The Domain A will have latest botnet controller list 




(BCL) because the Domain A Controller is connected to the 
Spamhaus server. At the same time, SDN Controller in the 
Domain A will begin to learn and detect anomaly traffic in the 
Domain A. The SDN Controller will use the existing 
algorithms and the proposed decision tree algorithm to analyze 
the SMTP frames as shown in Figures 4 and 5. The SDN 
controller Domain A will all blocked traffic based on 
algorithm decision tree and this information is forwarded and 
will update the Spamhaus server. This will enable botnet 
controller list (BCL) sharing between multi-domain SDNs. 
 
Fig.  5.  Decision tree algorithm 
IV. SIMULATION SETUP 
This section discussed the simulation setup using Mininet 
[34]. It allows one to create a virtual network and its 
components. The Mininet being used by OpenFlow for SDN 
simulation [35]. Figure 3 shows the overview architecture of 
simulation setup for this work. The simulation used the 
internet traffic dataset from University New Brunswick 
(UNB), Canada [36]. The same dataset was used by E. B. Beigi 
et al. [32] for botnet detection in their publication. Figures 6 
and 7 show the simulation of the dataset using Mininet. 
 
 
Fig. 6.  A flow graph of SYN flood 
 
Figures 8 and 9 show two traffics from seven traffic 
datasheets that were tested in the simulation. Figures 10 and 
Table 1 show the summary of max RTT and RTO for seven 
traffic datasheets. These results can be used to identify botnet 
smtp attack packets in a network. Refer to the decision tree in 
Fig.  4, any packet does not satisfy the decision tree is dropped 
from the SDN domain. 
Refer to the Botnet training and testing columns, any packet 
RTO between server and client greater than 2.2 seconds (a 
baseline from botnet training), the packet must be dropped.  
 
The RTO and RTO2 (2nd time runs of the RTO) provided 
significant results for a botnet detection. The 3WHS is 
expected to be less or equal to 0.045 second, which provides an 
unimportant timing for a botnet detection. 
 
 
Fig. 7.  A flow graph botnet for SYN flood (comment) 
V. RESULTS & DISCUSSION 
Refer to the Jun-12 until Jun-16 columns, the RTT between 
client and server must be less or equal to 0.03 second. The 
RTO and RTO2 are less than zero second, which provides an 
insignificant timing for a botnet detection. The 3WHS is 
expected to be less or equal to 0.045 second, which also 
provides an unimportant timing for a botnet detection. Refer to 
Figure 11 and Table 2, the TTL for botnet training and testing 
are equal to 128. 
 
 
Fig. 8.  A total of SMTP packets per second on 13 Jun 2010 
 
 





Fig. 10.  A summary of max RTT and RTO for seven traffic datasheets 
 
Table 1  




Fig.  11.  A graph of average TTL for packet for seven traffic datasheets 
 
Table 2  
A table of average TTL for packet for seven traffic datasheets 
 
VI. CONCLUSION 
We have presented multi-domain SDNs with Spamhaus 
server. The proposed method allows SDN Controllers to 
update the Spamhaus server with latest botnet controller 
list  (BCL) and it will help to prevent any botnet attack on 
smptp server from entering others SDN domains. We also 
discussed the method for analyzing SMTP traffics flow using 
decision tree algorithm. The method utilized a packet RTO 
between server and client to detect the SMTP traffic flow. We 
plan to implement the multi-domain SDNs with Spamhaus 
server as a future work. We hope the future experiment will 
provide a solution for securing the multi-domain SDNs from 
botnet attack to smtp server.  
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